The Korean Genocide Part 3: June 1950 – Who Started It?
(In Part 2 of this post I detailed the US propensity for installing and maintaining
corrupt and brutal clients as leaders, and their preference for those with a limited
popular base of support amongst their own countrymen. I showed that south of the 38th
parallel on the Korean peninsula, whilst under US military occupation, this immediately
unfolded as a combination economic, political and military repression. The inevitable
resistance prompted massacres at the hands of US or US-led proxy forces. I now
continue with the subject of the outbreak of “major hostilities” on the 23rd or 25th of
June 1950. I think the thing that will interest readers most in this is the significant
circumstantial evidence which indicates the real possibility of a tacit or explicit
agreement to foment war by US and USSR leaders.)
We now come to the vexed issue of the events of 25 June 1950, or as the North Koreans
would have it the 23rd of June when, according to them, the ROK initiated major
hostilities.1 This is when “major hostilities” broke out – the start of “The Korean War”.
But, one defensible stance is that it is a nonsense to state that the war broke out on that
day. Not only had guerrilla conflict and mass-murder already claimed over 100,000 lives
south of the 38th parallel, but there was ongoing extensive border fighting which was
particularly intense in 1949. It was mostly, but not solely by any means, the ROK which
was the initiator of hostilities.2 As Stueck writes: “Who started the firing in the predawn
hours of this dreary morning remains in doubt. The Ongjin region had long been the
setting for border skirmishes between North and South Korean troops, and often the
South had initiated the combat. The evidence for this day in June is ambiguous, even
contradictory.”3 Peter Lowe concludes that it is “impossible to determine” who attacked
The conundrum of the outbreak of major hostilities tends to suggest that simple
solutions of either a “South attacks North” or “North attacks South” scenario do not fit
the unusual circumstances. To begin with, as Cumings points out with regard to the
question of aggression this amounts to “Korea invades Korea”.5 Yes, there were two
different armies with two different associated territories, but his was not anything like
the German invasion of Poland. It wasn’t even like a normal civil war. The only reason
that there were two armies in the first place was the US decision to unilaterally divide
the country and the subsequent US and USSR actions which destroyed the normal
intercourse between the two parts. There is no historical precedent to this, but as unusual
a background as this provides to June 1950, it is only the tip of the iceberg. There are
what Stueck terms “ambiguous, even contradictory” factors. As will be described, both
sides had plans for military unification and were building forces towards that end, but
neither was actually prepared for the sudden outbreak of a major war when it did
happen. I would go so far as to suggest that the unusual circumstances themselves tend
to necessitate a more complex answer than simply one side attacked the other.
In this work, of course, the point of interest is the US role in the outbreak major
hostilities. Those who concern themselves with this question often characterise US
actions as a “failure of deterrence” or “failing to deter” or virtually invariant phrases.6
One writer in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, (not where one would normally expect
the advocacy of more robust militarism) wrote: “By strongly implying that it would not
defend Korea… the United States had invited attack”’7 It is also in the canon of failed
deterrence as standing alongside the “failure to deter” Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait.8 The problem with this is that it relies on an assumption which seems to be
contradicted by the evidence, the assumption that an entity called the US actually did not
want a war. One can compare this thesis with a counter-thesis thus: 1) the “failed
deterrence” thesis in which a monolithic US undertook insufficient actions to prevent
war; 2) the “successful provocation” thesis in which individuals from the US (including
those in the Rhee regime) successfully caused the outbreak of major hostilities at a time
which was entirely propitious for the US in strategic terms. An intriguing potential
corollary to the latter is that, whether through coordinated collusion or merely coincident
interests, this seems to have occurred with crucial support from the USSR.
It is interesting to note here that if the US failed to deter the DPRK, then the logical
implication is that it must have been the DPRK which attacked first on 25 June 1950.
Thus Stueck, who is unable to directly confirm DPRK initiation of hostilities, is able to
write at great length about a “failure of deterrence” which constantly reinforces this nonfact
as being factual in the reader’s mind. When dealing with only the “failure of
deterrence” DPRK initiation is assumed9 and never is the possibility of deterring the
ROK discussed, except to suggest that success in deterring the ROK was partly behind
the failure to deter the DPRK.10 If evidence comes to light that the ROK did launch an
offensive on 23 June then all of this “failed deterrence” discourse will be revealed as
rather silly propaganda akin to the Germans suggesting that they had failed to deter
Polish aggression in 1939, and since we can’t actually discount that possibility – it is
silly propaganda. There are those who claim that we can in fact conclude that it was the
DPRK which initiated major hostilities, and I will weigh such claims shortly. But before
I do, I should emphasise that the only evidence we have is circumstantial, and
furthermore is violently contradictory.
Former secretary of state Dean Acheson in 1965. (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum)
In 1981 and 1990 Bruce Cumings released the two seminal volumes of his work The
Origins of the Korean War. I have been unable to acquire this work, however some have
interpreted it as pointing to a US/ROK initiation or deliberate provocation of the Korean
War.11 Another viewpoint is that: “In contrast to many historians… who maintained that
by his remarks, Acheson unintentionally gave North Korea the green light to invade
South Korea, Cumings argues that Acheson knew precisely what he was doing and that
the speech had little to do with why North Korea invaded South Korea. ‘The Press Club
Speech,’ he remarks, ‘was … consistent with his conception of Korean containment in
1947, and with his world view: and so was the intervention in June 1950′ (p. 423).”12
Marilyn Young writes that Cumings largely rejects the relevance of “who started it” but
outlines three hypotheses in what seem to be roughly ordered as least to most likely: an
unprovoked ROK attack; an unprovoked DPRK attack; or a successfully provoked
DPRK attack which young describes as “the preferred Achesonian stance: the offence
I mention this work of Cumings at this point because the traction that this work might
have gained was interrupted to some extent in 1993 (not long in academic terms after the
publication of the more relevant second volume of The Origins of the Korean War) by
the publication of a book seized on by many as the definitive proof of an unprovoked
DPRK attack. Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War14 is a diplomatic
history of Sino-Soviet relations and, despite its name, only the final two chapters (about
35% of the main body) deal with the Korean war directly. One deals with the
DPRK build-up to military reunification, the last with China’s entry into the war.
It is difficult to decide how much space to devote to a critique of Uncertain Partners,
but I think I must confine myself to a symptomatic exemplar. For reasons which are not
at all apparent to me, several pages are devoted to describing two meetings that never
occurred. The reason given?
We do so partly to suggest the kinds of information that appear to have been exchanged between Moscow and Pyongyang in these months (on which the archives do have significant documents) and partly to indicate how pseudohistory can become widely implicated in efforts to explain the origins of one of history’s tragedies.15
Their actual interest in the role of “pseudohistory” ends right there never to be
mentioned again. Instead the narrative of these meetings is simply incorporated (with a
couple of reminders that these were fictional meetings) into the general flow of the
chapter. One might wonder why they did not instead utilise the “significant documents”
as their sources, but these are neither cited here, nor are they to be found among the 82
documents appended. In fact none of these documents deals with the subject of Korea
before one dated 28 June 1950.16 Indeed throughout the chapter there was only one point
made which seemed at first to support the conclusion that the DPRK attacked on 25
June, mention made of the “fact” that Mao was “in no doubt” that Kim Il Sung had
launched the war.17 The supporting citation, however, merely quotes a Chinese official
noting the Korean Workers Party’s determination to “wage a revolutionary war of
liberation”.18 Intent, however, is not the issue, as will be shown.
The gist of this chapter of Uncertain Partners (either with or without the inclusion of
clearly unreliable sources) is that Stalin, Mao and Kim Il Sung had developed a coordinated
plan of attack. This proves little, however, because Rhee also planned a
military reunification, and made no secret of the fact. He seems to have originally
envisioned invading at some time early in 1950, saying on 7 October 1949 that it would
be only “3 days to Pyonyang”, while defence minister Shin Sung-Mo, after 25 October
meeting with MacArthur, stated that the ROKA was “ready to drive into North Korea, If
we had had our own way we would have started already….”19 Dean Acheson’s Press Club
speech on 12 January 1950 explicitly rejected an US force being used to protect the
ROK, putting Rhee’s plans on hold, but invasion plans were revived after Rhee met with
MacArthur in February.20
Truman and Acheson had both effectively stated early in 1950 that the US would not
defend Korea militarily (even MacArthur had said as much in March 1949),21 and, on 2
May 1950, Senator Tom Connally, chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations, said
that a communist take-over of Korea and Taiwan was inevitable: “the US would not go
to fight for Korea”.22 However, Rhee must have either been given contrary assurances in
private or have correctly read between the lines of these statements which were shown
by subsequent events to be complete falsehoods. On 11 January the ROK ambassador to
the US sent the following to Rhee:
I give you some encouraging news which I have received confidentially from a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I am informed that the State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with respect to the U.S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan, Korea will occupy an important position…President Truman will sign, very soon, authorization which will grant permission for armament for Korean ships and planes.23
Around March 1950 the DPRK achieved military superiority over the ROK24 and thus
US involvement became essential. Aware that the US could not support an attack north,
the focus in the ROK became an effort to “provoke an ‘unprovoked assault’”.25
In the DPRK, meanwhile, preparations for military unification had begun in earnest in
late April with major arms shipments from the USSR.26 This followed Stalin’s assent to
conduct an offensive.27 Here’s where things get a little contradictory, because the
Soviets sent a group of advisers to Pyongyang, supposedly as a response to Kim Il
Sung’s determination to conquer the whole peninsula, but it seems that it was the Soviet
advisers who took the initiative in making this happen. In Uncertain Partners a lengthy
testimony from KPA Operations Director Yu Sung Chul states that the Soviet advisers
took an operations plan (“[e]very army, of course, has an operations plan”) and
unilaterally rewrote it entirely. The Soviets considered it too “defensive”. The original
operations plan was for a counteroffensive, but the new Soviet plan was entitled the
“Preempitve Strike Operations Plan”, though the DPRK leadership insisted immediately
that it only be referred to as the “counterattack” plan.28 Goncharov et al. maintain that
Kim Il Sung was the driving force behind the offensive, suggesting effectively that Kim
was the tail wagging the Soviet dog29 despite also claiming that the DPRK was a
“wholly dependent… Soviet satellite”.30 The story of the operations plan, however,
suggests instead that this was Stalin’s war, not Kim’s, just as was claimed by the US
government at the time.31
Kathryn Weathersby deals with this issue and this is how she concludes:
From 1945 to early 1950, Moscow’s aim was not to gain control over the Korean peninsula. Instead, the Soviet Union sought to protect its strategic and economic interests through the traditional Tsarist approach of maintaining a balance of power in Korea. However, in the context of the postwar Soviet-American involvement on the peninsula, such a balance could only be maintained by prolonging the division of the country, retaining effective control over the northern half.
The North Korean attempt to reunify the country through a military campaign clearly represented a sharp departure from the basic Soviet policy toward Korea. The initiative for this departure came from Pyongyang, not Moscow. In the spring of 1950 Stalin approved Kim’s reunification plan and provided the necessary military support, but only after repeated appeals from Kim and only after having been persuaded that the United States would not intervene in the conflict. Conclusive evidence of Stalin’s reasons for finally supporting the North Korean reunification plan has not yet been released, but it appears that Stalin’s motive may well have been to tie the Chinese communists more firmly to the USSR, to prevent a rapprochement between the PRC and the United States. If this interpretation is correct, it means that it was Soviet weakness that drove Stalin to support the attack on South Korea, not the unrestrained expansionism imagined by the authors of NSC-68.32
Indeed, Weathersby reveals that from the latter stages of World War II the Soviet Union
was utterly consistent in recognising that it was best served by a divided Korea and that
unification would risk that advent of a hostile entity in a threatening position: “Given the
impossibility of establishing a ‘friendly’ government for the entire country, Moscow
sought to protect Soviet security by maintaining a compliant government in power in the
northern half of the country and shoring up the military strength of that client state.”33
The situation was mirrored on the US side, as has been suggested.
The obvious question here is why, if the USSR considered its interests best served by a
divided Korea, did it force an aggressive “preemptive strike” plan on the DPRK and
begin immediately making substantial arms shipments beyond those required for
defence? In the situation there was ample scope for temporising and prevarication. But
Soviet concerns also seem to have revolved around the situation of China and Taiwan,
and here too the interests coincided to a great degree with those of the US. Here, I am
sad to say, the picture gets even more confused.
I return again to the narrative of Uncertain Partners wherein the contradictions of the
circumstances are unwittingly laid bare by the authors. Their understanding is that Kim
Il Sung was single-mindedly driven to unify Korea by force, and that the plan was
assented to by Stalin and Mao. The Chinese were focussed on finishing their civil war
by eliminating the final GMD stronghold in Taiwan, but at the same time faced an
urgent need to improve the desperate domestic economic situation which they believed
necessitated massive demobilisations of troops. The Chinese were convinced that a
DPRK offensive would bring about the direct involvement of the US and allow the US
to prevent their final offensive against the GMD, while many feared that it would allow
the US to attack the PRC itself.34 According to the authors “a race had begun between
Kim and Mao. Each rushed to fire the first volley, an act that could doom the other’s
plans.”35 The problem here is that it is difficult to see how a PRC conquest of Taiwan
would have negatively affected DPRK plans. There was no claim on any side that there
was such a state as Taiwan, this was a civil conflict between two formations which each
claimed to be the legitimate government of China. On 5 January 1950, Truman had
acknowledged Taiwan as being part of China and pledged not to intervene in the civil
war, while Acheson’s 12 January Press Club speech omitted not just Korea but Taiwan
from the perimeter which the US claimed as its right to defend.36 The US people, by and
large, viewed the Taiwan issue as part of a civil war, not any business of the US.37
Moreover, the PRC did not act very much like it was in a “race”. To be certain it wished
to take Taiwan as soon as possible, but it had every reason to do so without any
consideration of possible events in Korea. The other major offshore island, Hainan, had
been taken in April 195038 and in that month PLA forces began to amass for the invasion
Taiwan, but demobilisations were also an ongoing priority. Early in June the invasion of
Taiwan was postponed until the summer of 1951. On June 15 Mao ordered a previously
planned demobilisation of 1,500,000 troops to commence.39 On June 23, less than 48
hours from the putative outbreak of the Korean War, orders were made out to transfer 3-
4 corps out of the northeast sector.40 It is true that the Chinese had transferred 40,000
Koreans from the PLA to the KPA beginning at the end of 1949, and these battlehardened
troops probably gave the KPA more of an advantage over the ROKA by June
25 than the increased arms supply from the USSR, which had commenced only two
months prior.41 But, the Chinese may have expected these personnel to be used
defensively or to create a deterrent, after all it makes little sense for them to have
knowingly provided crucial support for an offensive which they quite correctly predicted
would be a disastrous setback for themselves.
From the US and USSR perspective, however, the defeat of the GMD in Taiwan was not
a pleasing prospect. Stalin appears to have firstly hoped that the US would prevent the
PRC conquest of Taiwan42 and secondly he hoped that China and the US would be
drawn further into enmity. Weathersby recounts: “A Russian scholar who has seen the
relevant documents has recounted to me that Stalin calculated that even though the
United States might not defend the ROK, once it lost South Korea it would not then
allow itself to suffer the additional loss of Taiwan. The United States would move in to
protect Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), thereby preventing a rapprochement between the
US and the PRC. Mao would thus be forced to continue to turn to the Soviet Union for
economic and military aid.”43
So the US and USSR interests regarding the dispositions of Korea and Taiwan were
identical. Additionally one might argue that it was in the US interest that China remain
for the time being a comparatively weak state tied to the USSR, rather than an
independent left-wing non-aligned state. What then would be the optimal outcome for
both imperial powers? That somehow, against all odds, Korea would be overcome by a
major war but not unified, leaving two weakened dependencies divided much as they
were in 1945; that the US be given a serviceable pretext/distraction allowing it to
intercede in the final stages of China’s civil war; and, perhaps more than anything else,
that China, so ripe with potential, be prevented from demobilisation and an end to nearly
a century of destruction and instead be drawn into even greater enfeebling conflict. No
outside observer would have picked this as the likely outcome, but this is exactly what
All accounts agree that 3 a.m. 25 June 1950 Kim Il Sung announced to his cabinet that
the ROKA had launched an offensive and that in 1 hour the KPA would launch its
planned counterattack. Whether there was or was not an ROKA provocation, the one
thing that can be said with certainty is that either Kim was fooled, or he fooled himself.
The planned campaign to unify Korea is widely understood to have been intended to
have been enacted at a later date, possibly in early August when it was expected that
Rhee would refuse to comply with a DPRK proposal of nationwide elections.44 Gye-
Dong Kim points to the following indications of unpreparedness: 1) the mobilisation
plan was not put in place, only 6 full divisions were ready when plans called for 13 to
15; 2) “the North Koreans were not sufficiently well equipped at the time” having
mostly Japanese weapons of pre-1945 manufacture.45 I would add that given that the
DPRK’s military build-up was proceeding faster than that of the ROK, premature action,
whether offensive or counter-offensive, must have been powerfully motivated.
The explanation given by Gye-Dong Kim is that the offensive/counter-offensive was
launched at this unpropitious time because Kim sought to take advantage of the
unpopularity and instability of the Rhee regime.46 The Soviet, Chinese and defector
sources used by the likes of Goncharov et al., are consistent in claiming that when
touting his plans for a military unification Kim would evince a conviction that 200,000
guerrillas would rise up to defeat the Rhee regime.47 In the most widely known account,
given by Khrushchev, Kim claimed that he wished to “touch the south with the tip of a
bayonet” which would spark internal explosion.48 One way of looking at things,
therefore, is that Kim, an autocrat with unquestioned authority, was possessed of a longstanding
idée fixe, an obsessive and (in the circumstances) irrational belief that
demonstrative military action on the part of the KPA would spark a southern revolution.
But, another way of looking at things, one which throws very serious doubts on the “tip
of the bayonet” hypothesis, is that Kim was an experienced and successful guerrilla
leader who was surrounded by and incredible wealth of knowledge gained by fighting
the Japanese and the GMD for decades. Along with those of Moscow faction, the Yenan
faction and Kim Il Sung’s faction, these included indigenous fighters such as the the
southerner Pak Hon-yong,49 who was the foreign minister.50 The leaders of Cumings’s
“guerrilla state” also had some experience, in China, of conventional and mixed warfare
and were advised by Soviets from an army which had fought its way from Stalingrad to
Berlin. These were hard-nosed experienced leaders who had won very hard fought
desperate wars, and they had not done so by being prone to wishful thinking.
Guerrilla activity in the south was at this time hugely diminished. According to US
intelligence “small bands of fifteen to thirty still operated in various areas but were
generally quiet.”51 The political situation in the south may have provided the opportunity
for reconstituting a more formidable guerrilla movement, but such things take time.52 It
seems very unlikely that the DPRK leadership really believed that 200,000 guerrillas
would arise spontaneously which is what a defector claimed to have been stated by Pak
Hon-yong to a secret conference on 11 May 1950.53 In fact, Goncharov et al. claim that
it was the failure of the guerrilla movement which prompted the DPRK to begin
planning a major military effort,54 as do Stueck,55 and Kim.56 If the DPRK really was
pinning its hopes on a southern uprising, it also seems rather odd that those guerrillas
that remained were not informed or prepared in any way.57
A salient matter which I have not yet mentioned is an aspect of the “counterattack” plan.
This plan, which, as will be recalled, was written by Soviet advisers without
consultation, stopped at Seoul. That is to say that the planning did not extend any
further than the capture of Seoul which lies only about 50 kilometres from the 38th
parallel.58 The war was supposed to “only last a few days” according to Yu Sung Chul
and others. Continuing after the capture of Seoul required a completely new offensive
plan (again authored by the Soviets) and a complete reorganisation of the KPA into two
distinct corps which were lacking in communications leaving, according to one defector,
“divisions, corps and armies… disconnected” to the extent that “[e]ach unit moved on its
own and each had its own plan.”59 Gye-Dong Kim’s explanation is that the actual plan
was to seize Seoul as a prelude to opening negotiations. He cites a 20 June 1950 decree
by the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly in the DPRK which contained
demands which could be read as a basis for negotiations.60 Given that the
“counterattack” plan was drafted in early April, and that it replaced another that was too
“defensive”, this must in fact have been the basis of planning from the beginning. This
contradicts a great deal of the tenor and detail of the narrative of the planning phase
constructed from various sources by Kim himself (along with Stueck, Weathersby,
Goncharov et al.). The fact is that whether attack or counter-attack, there are many
questions arising about the KPA’s actions on 25 June, but to even attempt answers I must
first turn to the events occurring on the other side of the 38th parallel, and in Taiwan,
Japan and the US.
Direct evidence is slim that the ROKA launched an attack somewhere between 10 pm on
23 June (the time claimed by the DPRK and PRC to this day)61 and 4 am on 25 June
(when all parties agree the KPA guns opened fire, though not in any account along the
whole front). The ROKA 17th regiment claimed to have captured Haeju by 11 am of 26
June.62 As William Blum points out, this feat would have been impossible if the KPA
really were launching a co-ordinated all-out attack.63 This unit was commanded by a
committed right-wing ideologue,64 and its actions may have fitted a scenario of a
unilateral attack without a broader mobilisation designed to “provoke an unprovoked”
response from the DPRK. This may or may not have been accompanied by over 24
hours of preliminary artillery barrage as claimed by the DPRK. There is also the
possibility, however, that the capture of Haeju was simply a lie. The ROK government
later retracted its claim to have captured Haeju and claimed that it was all an
exaggeration by a military officer.65
Rhee, Hodge and Kim Koo
One town south of the 38th parallel was prepared for fighting to break out on the 25th.66
However, in more general terms, the ROKA was even less prepared than was the KPA
for the outbreak of major hostilities. A UN inspection on 23 June found the ROKA
unprepared for war and they began writing a report detailing as much on the 24th which,
by the 26th, had become a report claiming an unprovoked attack by the DPRK. Of
course, this is rather astonishingly suspicious timing and, as Halliday and Cumings point
out, their sources were purely ROK and US officials,67 but subsequent events show that
the ROKA really was unprepared for the KPA onslaught even though we can quite
confidently say that the KPA itself was not bringing its full potential force to bear.
What does this all mean? Well, if the thesis tested with regard to DPRK, USSR and PRC
actions was that of a co-ordinated unprovoked attack at a time of USSR and/or DPRK
choosing, then the thesis I will test with regard to ROK, US and GMD actions is one of
a successful provocation taking place at a time of ROK and/or US choosing. Of
necessity this would mean that the Rhee regime and/or the US deliberately left their own
forces unprepared for an offensive which was both expected and desired. In fact, there
would have to be posited a cultivated unpreparedness, both as an alibi and as a means of
luring the DPRK into attacking.
I will set the tone here with a lengthy quote, with lengthier subquotes, from Peter Dale
Scott. This is what he culls from Cumings’s Origins of the Korean War:
The historian Bruce Cumings, in a volume of 957 pages, has recalled the curious behavior in previous weeks of high levels in Washington:
The CIA predicts, on June 14, a capability for invasion [of South Korea] at any time. No one disputes that. Five days later, it predicts an impending invasion. . . . Now, Corson … says that the June 14 report leaked out to “informed circles,” and thus “it was feared that administration critics in Congress might publicly raise the issue. In consequence, a White House decision of sorts was made to brief Congress that all was well in Korea.” . . . Would it not be the expectation that Congress would be told that all was not well in Korea? That is, unless a surprised and outraged Congress is one’s goal.
In his exhaustive analysis of the war’s origins, Cumings sees this U.S. deception by high level officials as a response to manipulated events, which in turn were the response to the threat of an imminent expulsion of the Chinese Nationalist KMT68 from Taiwan, together with a peaceful reunification of Korea. ….
By late June, [U.S. Secretary of State Dean] Acheson and Truman were the only high officials still balking at a defense of the ROC [the "Republic of China," the KMT Chinese Nationalist remnant on Taiwan]….Sir John Pratt, an Englishman with four decades of experience in the China consular service and the Far Eastern Office, wrote the following in 1951: “The Peking Government planned to liberate Formosa on July 15 and, in the middle of June, news reached the State Department that the Syngman Rhee government in South Korea was disintegrating. The politicians on both sides of the thirty-eighth parallel were preparing a plan to throw Syngman Rhee out of office and set up a unified government for all Korea.”….Thus the only way out, for Chiang [Kai-shek, the KMT leader], was for Rhee to attack the North, which ultimately made Acheson yield and defend Nationalist China [on Taiwan].
Meanwhile, in South Korea,
an Australian embassy representative sent in daily reports in late June, saying that “patrols were going in from the South to the North, endeavouring to attract the North back in pursuit. Plimsoll warned that this could lead to war and it was clear that there was some degree of American involvement as well.” [According to former Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam,] “The evidence was sufficiently strong for the Australian Prime Minister to authorize a cable to Washington urging that no encouragement be given to the South Korean government.”
Cumings also notes the warning in late April from an American diplomat, Robert Strong, that “desperate measures may be attempted by [the Chinese] Nationalist Government to involve [U.S.] in [a] shooting war as [a] means of saving its own skin.” In chapters too complex to summarize here, he chronicles the intrigues of a number of Chiang’s backers, including the China Lobby in Washington, General Claire Chennault and his then nearly defunct airline CAT (later Air America), former OSS chief General William Donovan, and in Japan General MacArthur and his intelligence chief Charles Willoughby. He notes the visit of two of Chiang’s generals to Seoul, one of them on a U.S. military plane from MacArthur’s headquarters. And he concludes that “Chiang may have found …on the Korean peninsula, the provocation of a war that saved his regime [on Taiwan] for two more decades:”
Anyone who has read this text closely to this point, and does not believe that Willoughby, Chiang, [Chiang’s emissary to Seoul, General] Wu Tieh Cheng, Yi Pōm-sōk, [Syngman] Rhee, Kim Sōkwon, Tiger Kim, and their ilk were capable of a conspiracy to provoke a war, cannot be convinced by any evidence.
He adds that anti-conspiratorialist Americans “are prey to what might be called the fallacy of insufficient cynicism”69
(Yi Pom-sok, Kim Sok-won and Tiger Kim were all involved in the 17th regiment which
may, or may not, have captured Haeju on or before 26 June.)70
Police Chief Chang Taek-sang with a man who may be Tiger Kim (left)
Indeed, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity centred around the ROK which seems
very suspiciously timed in retrospect. I can add one more prominent diplomatic event to
those mentioned above. The event that looms (and loomed) large in DPRK propaganda
was the visit of John Foster Dulles in mid-June 1950. In particular, a photograph of
Dulles with the ROK defence minister and military officers peering across the 38th
parallel has been used as the iconic visual signifier of aggressive intent.71 Lowe writes
that the “murky” talks leave room for “legitimate speculation”,72 adding later that:
“Mystery surrounds the precise motives for Dulles’s visit to Seoul”73 On 6 April 1950,
John Foster Dulles was reappointed as an adviser to the State Department. The
Republican hard-liner had been chosen reluctantly by Democrat Truman administration
as a salve to “the explosion of McCarthyism”. In a broadcast dated 14 May 1950 he
suggested that the US needed to “develop better techniques’ because the Soviets ‘could
win everything by the Cold War they could win in a hot war.’”74John Foster Dulles peers across the 38th parallel.
I. F. Stone in his 1952 classic The Hidden History of the Korean War wrote:
Chiang Kai-shek and Rhee…feared that peace would be the end of them. Dulles feared that peace
would fatally interfere with the plan to rebuild the old Axis powers for a new anti-Soviet
crusade…the dominant trend in American political, economic and military thinking was fear of
peace. General Van Fleet summed it all up in speaking to a visiting Filipino delegation in January,
1952: ‘Korea has been a blessing. There had to be a Korea either here or someplace in the world.’
In this simple-minded confession lies the key to the hidden history of the Korean War.75
Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chang Kai-Shek)
On the 18th Dulles addressed the ROK national assembly, pledging US support “both
moral and material”.76 The next morning Rhee requested an unscheduled interview with
Dulles. According to the official US State Department history:
Mr Dulles went to considerable lengths to explain that formal pacts, allegiences or treaties were not necessary prerequisites to common action against a common foe and that the important thing was for a government to prove by its actions that it was in fact a loyal [my emph.] member of the free world in which case it could count on the support of other members of the free world against the forces of communism.77
This is, of course, quite a testament in itself to the power that the not-as-yet fully
realised Cold War paradigm, Dulles, a mere adviser to the Secretary of State, felt he
could openly demand loyalty (and one may pause here to think what it could mean to be
“a loyal member of the free world”) in exchange for protection.
Dulles was in Tokyo on 25 June, able to communicate directly with MacArthur as events
unfolded. He was thus able to advocate an immediate aggressive response.78
What evidence, then, exists that the US actively sought to bring about war? If one
hypothesises that the desirable way to bring about war would be to make the ROK an
attractive target for a DPRK offensive, there are certainly considerable factors which
accord with such a course of action.
To begin with, there are the “failures of deterrence” embodied in US officials’
declarations that they would not intervene militarily if either the ROK or Taiwan were
attacked. On 5 January 1950, at a press conference, Truman stated: “The United States
has no predatory designs on Formosa, or on any other Chinese territory. The United
States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges, or to establish military bases
on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its Armed Forces to
interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course
which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.”79
On 12 January Dean Acheson gave his speech to the Press Club: “Beyond Japan, the
Ryukyus, and the Philippines, the United States could not guarantee areas in the Western
Pacific ‘against military attack.’ The people in such areas must rely initially on their own
efforts to defend themselves, but then on ‘the United Nations which so far has not
proved a weak read to lean on by . . . [those] who are determined to protect their
independence against outside aggression.’”80 Mention of the United Nations is
interesting because the USSR had a veto over UNSC resolutions and yet, as will be seen,
failed to use it under rather strange circumstances, thus allowing the US to intervene
directly but under a UN mandate.
As has already been mentioned, in May Senator Tom Connally was even more explicit
that “the US would not go to fight for Korea”. Yet the US committed forces to fight in
Korea and to intervene to save Taiwan with extreme alacrity. In fact, in Japan the
response seems to have started some days before 25 June when “many vehicles were
taken out of store facilities and… American military activities increased.”81 After less
than 48 hours the US had decided on committing troops. Halliday and Cumings state
that the “United Nations was used to ratify American decisions,” quoting an official JCS
study: “Having resolved upon armed intervention for itself, the US government the next
day sought the approval and the assistance of the United Nations.”82 On 27 June, Truman
announced that the US 7th Fleet was in the Taiwan strait.83 On that same day the US
began aerial and naval bombardments which included targets above the 38th parallel. On
28 June the 24th US Infantry Division had landed and took command of all ground forces
A threat is when party a informs party b that if b undertakes action set x then a will
undertake action set y which will cause a negative impact on b. If a does not actually
intend to undertake action set y then this is commonly referred to as a bluff. It is
intended to deter b from doing x. If a leads b to believe that it will not undertake y and
then does so this, is the opposite of a bluff. In practical terms it is a form of inducement.
Most commentators suggest that probably neither Stalin nor Kim Il Sung took US
implications of non-intervention seriously, but it is absolutely clear that if the DPRK had
anticipated the actual US reaction that eventuated they would not have ventured in force
below the 38th parallel.
There is another manner by which the ROK was made a more tempting target than
might have otherwise been the case, and that is the restrictions placed on its military
build-up. The ROKA was even more poorly equipped than the KPA on 25 June 1950.
The following table is taken from a Russian history of the war:85
1 : 2.2
(The KPA had 172 combat aircraft, but only 32 trained pilots,86 another factor suggesting
a mysteriously premature action on 25 June.)
The failure to provide tanks, aircraft and self-propelled artillery is entirely consistent
with deterring any ROK offensives, but the ROKA lacked more defensive armaments
also. The most noted factor is the lack of usable anti-tank weapons, something which
must assuredly be of more use in deterring KPA offensive action than it would be in
facilitating ROKA offensive action.87
There are hints then that the DPRK may have been deceived into thinking that the time
was ripe for a push south when in fact this was most advantageous to their enemies. I
have already mentioned the ways in which the USSR, US, GMD (Guomindang) and
Rhee regime benefited from an outbreak of war at this time, but it is worth elaborating
further on the benefits to the US. To begin with, there is the matter of NSC-68 and the
rearmament of the US. The outbreak of the Korean War is held to have been crucial in
bringing about the implementation of NSC-68. The importance of this document is
amply demonstrated by the fact that its fundamental structuring of the US political
economy has lasted now for over 60 years, more than 2 decades longer than the
“Communist threat” it was putatively created to address. Chris Floyd describes it as “the
document that more than any other engineered the militarisation of America”.88 David
Fautua writes: “Truman finally approved NSC 68 as a national security policy on 30
September 1950. By 31 May 1951, the military budget swelled to $48,000,000,000,
nearly quadrupling the prewar authorization [of $13.5 billion].”89 Winston Churchill
considered that the entire importance of the Korean War was that it led to US
rearmament.90 Not only that, but the outbreak of the Korean War prompted the
rearmament of NATO turning it into “an effective alliance”,91 and prompting an increase
of 3 million personnel.92 By 1953 the US had achieved and enormous “strategic
asymmetry” in its favour over the Soviet Union to an extent “approaching absolute
Nor was it only the Rhee regime that was looking unsustainable on 25 June. Jiang
Jieshi’s grip on power had become so tenuous that the US covert officers were
themselves planning a coup against him. This, however, was a move of desperation, the
GMD were widely considered to be a lost cause.94 The US had led the effort to prevent
the PRC from being recognised the legitimate Chinese state in the UN,95 but the sheer
ridiculousness of leaving the GMD in place as “China” while the PRC constituted the
entire mainland had brought about a tide of international opinion which was getting hard
to resist.96 If the PRC gained UN membership there would be absolutely no way that the
US could intervene in its civil war without attracting condemnation as an aggressor. It
should be noted too that, unlike Korea, Taiwan was considered to have considerable
military strategic significance: “’An unsinkable aircraft carrier’ positioned 100 miles off
the China coast, as General MacArthur characterized it, Taiwan was regarded by
military leaders as more important than South Korea.”97 Of course, it would be
inconsistent of me not to point out that such strictly military strategic matters are less
significant than broader economic, geographical and demographic strategic concerns of
imperial hegemony, but nevertheless this sort of “power projection” asset has a key role
such considerations as well as in its own right .
UNSC Resolutions 82 to 85 are all titled “Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of
Korea”. UNSCR 82, which was passed on the 25 June no less, “notes with grave
concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea” and
“determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace.”98 Two days later UNSCR
83 recommended that “members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack….”99 UNSCR 84 (7
July) arrogated unified command of UN forces to the US.100 There was no hurry, of
course, because no other troops would arrive for a month or so, and at all stages of the
war US troop numbers far outnumbered the combined numbers of other UN forces.101 In
all practical senses this was a unilateral US intervention, but one occurring under a UN
banner, an interesting eventuality when one reflects on Acheson’s words of January the
In fact the US was only able to obtain such timely UN facilitation due to a couple of
rather felicitously timed events. The aforementioned UN report revealing, largely on the
say-so of US and ROK personnel, that the ROK was not engaging in offensive actions,
had actually been commenced on the 24th and a draft was available by the 26th. Halliday
and Cumings summarise the circumstances of the writing process:
UNCOK members woke up in Seoul on Sunday morning to a war, wrote a report based on the limited observations of two people and whatever the Koreans and Americans chose to tell them, and then were in the care of the American military for the next three days. They left all their archives behind in Seoul, making it impossible to verify the information that UNCOK had at its disposal.102
The other fortuitous circumstance is the absence of the USSR from the UNSC. “In midJanuary
the Soviets walked out of the UN Security Council, allegedly to protest its
failure to seat Communist China but probably actually to freeze the Mao regime out of
the international organization….”103 Had the USSR been sitting it would have seemed
very odd had it not vetoed UNSCRs 82 to 85. As it is, the Soviet ambassador was
perfectly capable of attending just the sessions in question to exercise a veto but did not
do so on direct instructions from Stalin himself, against objections from Andrei
Gromyko.104 Goncharov et al. speculate that allowing UN cover obviated the risk that a
subsequent formal declaration of war between the US and China would draw the USSR
into World War III due to its treaty obligations.105 The US did not need to start such a
war, but whether Stalin feared that they wished to or not, he was once again going
above-and-beyond the call of prudent enmity and providing crucial support for the US in
its attacks on those who were the Soviet Union’s supposed allies by dint of ideology, and
(in this case) formal ties.
The question still remains then, why did the KPA advance south of the 38th in force at a
time so propitious to the US, so seemingly crucial to the survival of Rhee and Jiang, so
disadvantageous to the PRC, and so premature with regard to its own preparations? The
anomaly does not disappear if one assumes that there was in fact an ROKA offensive
against Haeju, or anywhere else. It would seem that some unknown factor caused the
DPRK to send its forces south. A logical suspicion would be that the DPRK leadership
were victims of a ruse, and exploring this option may clarify matters. Imagine, for
example, that the USSR had fed false intelligence to the DPRK suggesting that the
ROKA was on the verge of mutiny or ready to disintegrate with only the slightest push.
This is almost exactly what the US did with its unruly quasi-client Saddam Hussein
when it supplied false intelligence to his regime in 1980, as Barry Lando explains:
To encourage Saddam to attack, the United States passed on intelligence reports exaggerating the political turmoil in Iran. All Saddam had to do was to dispatch his troops across the border and the regime would collapse. According to Howard Teicher, who served on the White House National Security Council, ‘the reports passed on to Baghdad depicted Iran’s military in chaos, riven by purges and lack of replacement parts for its American-made weapons. The inference was that Iran could be speedily overcome.’
‘We were clearly stuffing his head with nonsense, to make conditions look better than they were,’ commented Richard Sale, who covered the intelligence community for United Press International at the time. ‘The information was deliberately fabricated to encourage him to go in.’106
Such a deception would resolve the enigma of the DPRK attack, and an equivalent ruse
would not be beyond the capabilities of the US. Another matter that is both suggestive
and offers a shard of illumination is the sudden change of plan by the KPA on reaching
Seoul. Whatever they had originally planned to do on reaching Seoul, by its fall on the
28th it was apparently obsolete and, as outlined above, a new plan to take the entire
peninsula had to be hastily created. This would suggest that whatever misapprehension
the DPRK laboured under was belied very rapidly after the 25th. Given what we
understand of the DPRK plan it seems to me most likely that it was the sudden
intervention of the US which was the unwelcome surprise. The weight of evidence
suggests that the DPRK sought to seize the pretext of some ROKA action to launch a
quick offensive with the optimal aim of seizing Seoul. This is how Bruce Cumings
describes what some documents related to such planning reveal:
Kim Il Sung’s basic conception of a Korean War, originated at least by August 1949: namely, attack the cul de sac of Ongjin (which no sane blitzkreig commander would do precisely because it is a cul de sac), move eastward and grab Kaesong, and then see what happens. At a minimum this would establish a much more secure defense of P’yôngyang, which was quite vulnerable from Ongjin and Kaesong. At maximum, it might open Seoul to his forces. That is, if the southern army collapses, move on to Seoul and occupy it in a few days.107
In other words the plan to attack Ongjin reinforces that fact that this was intended to be a
short offensive leading to negotiations from a position of superiority or, at worst,
consolidated territorial gains. This would explain why full preparation and mobilisation
was considered less important than seizing a pretext. The DPRK, in this case, must have
been very confident that the US would not intervene. The ROK, abandoned by the US
and riven by internal discontent and political instability, could be forced to negotiate
terms which would lead to eventual political union. If negotiations fail to bring this
about, or even while they are ongoing, the DPRK would retain its territorial gains and
facilitate the relaunch of a revolutionary guerrilla war in the south which would assure
eventual victory. Instead, once it was clear that the US was going to bring as much force
to bear as it could as quickly as it could, the DPRK had no choice but to commit the
KPA to a blitzkrieg assault, a race to the tip of the peninsula before the US could commit
enough forces to prevent such a conquest. This would also explain why, following the
sudden change of plan, the KPA was forced, despite being well aware of the dangers
posed, to stretch its improvised communications and its supply lines in an attempt to
decide the issue before it was too late.
This is all somewhat speculative, but bear in mind that it is the only way of resolving the
contradictions and anomalies that appear in our current understanding of these events.
The reader may wonder why I have devoted so much effort to exploring the events
culminating on 25 June 1950 when I cannot provide absolute answers as to what
happened. What the reader is required to understand is that the balance of probability is
firmly on the side of US foreknowledge of these events and, indeed, that it acted in some
manner to bring them about. There are far too many putatively coincidental
circumstances which favoured the US, and they are far too closely timed to avoid
serious suspicion. The means, motive and opportunity are there. The surprise evinced by
the US is belied by that haste of its commitment of forces and such postures end by
looking more like conscious efforts at establishing alibis. Consider this passage from
With all this bubbling activity, the last weekend in June 1950 nonetheless dawned on a torpid, somnolent, and very empty Washington. Harry Truman was back home in Independence. Acheson was at his Sandy Spring country farm, Rusk was in New York, Kennan had disappeared to a remote summer cottage without so much as a telephone, Paul Nitze was salmon fishing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were occupied elsewhere, and even the United Nations representative, Warren Austin, was not at his post.108
Knowing that there is a strong likelihood of a US role in instigating the “Korean War” is
important in what follows.
1 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 71.
2 Ibid, p 54.
3 Stueck, The Korean War, p 10.
4 Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, p 178.
5 Cumings, The Korean War, p 22.
6 William Stueck, for example, is the leading proponent of this view. See: Stueck and Yi, ‘An Alliance Forged in
Blood….’, p 204; Stueck; The Korean War, p 29; Stueck, Rethinking The Korean War, p 78; Stueck, “The United
States and the Origins of the Korean War: The Failure of Deterrence”, in International Journal of Korean Studies,
24:2, Fall 2010, pp 1-18; for others who echo this see Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 42, and below.
7 Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24:4,
December 1980, p 581.
8 Austin Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six decades of Rand Deterrence Research,
Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburg: RAND, 2008, p 9.
9 Stueck, “The United States and the Origins of the Korean War…”, pp 1-2 et passim.
10 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, pp 42-3.
11 Peter Dale Scott, “9/11, Deep State Violence and the Hope of Internet Politics”, Global Research, 22 June 2008.
Retrieved 25 June 2008 from http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9289.
12 Burton I. Kaufman, “Review: Decision-Making and the Korean War”, in Reviews in American History, 20:4,
December 1992, p 564.
13 Young, “Sights of and Unseen War”, p 500.
14 Sergei Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993.
15 Ibid, p 137.
16 Ibid, p 270.
17 Ibid, p 159.
18 Ibid, p 334, n 140.
19 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 39.
20 Ibid, p 40.
21 Stueck, The Korean War, p 30.
22 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 42.
23 Quoted in Appendix to S. Brian Willson, “Korea, Like Viet Nam: A War Originated and Maintained by Deceit”, 1
December 1999. Retrieved 3 November 2011 from http://www.brianwillson.com/korea-like-Viet Nam-a-waroriginated-
24 Ibid, p 41.
25 Cumings, The Korean War, p 144.
26 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p 147.
27 Ibid, p 144.
28 Ibid, p 150.
29 Ibid, pp 132-3 et passim.
30 Ibid, p 131.
31 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-50: New Evidence
From Russian Archives”, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 8, p 7.
32 Ibid, p 36.
33 Ibid, p 27.
34 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p 154.
35 Ibid, p 147.
36 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 35.
37 Stueck, The Korean War, p 75.
38 Anthony Farrar-Hockley, “The China Factor in the Korean War”, in James Cotton and Ian Neary (eds), The Korean
War in History, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989, p 5.
39 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p 152.
40 Ibid, p 153.
41 Farrar-Hockley, “The China Factor”, p 5.
42 Stueck, The Korean War, p 36.
43Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea….”, p 35.
44 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 35.
45 Ibid, pp 37-8.
46 Ibid, p 38.
47 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p 144.
48 Ibid, p 138.
49 Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, p 12.
50 Ibid, p 58.
51 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 50.
52 Mao can be used as an authority on the ‘gradual’ nature of the process in which critical developments are said to
occur ‘eventually’ (Mao Tse-tung, Guerrilla Warfare, (Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, trans) Fleet Marine
Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18, Washington D.C.: United States Marine Corps, Department of the
Navy, 1989, passim).
53 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 37.
54 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p 136.
55 Stueck, The Korean War, p 31.
56 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 36.
57 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p 155.
58 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 38.
59Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p 155.
60 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 38.
61 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 71.
63 Blum, Killing Hope, p 46.
64 Korea, p 71.
65 Blum, Killing Hope, p 46.
66 Korea, p 73.
67 Ibid, p 76.
68 KMT, deriving from Kuomintang, is an alternative acronym to GMD, which derives from the differing
69 Scott, “9/11 and Deep State Politics….”
70 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, pp 76-7.
71 Ibid, p 66.
72 Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, p 174.
73 Ibid, p 183.
74 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 49, n 57.
75 Quoted in S. Brian Willson, “Korea, Like Viet Nam: A War Originated and Maintained by Deceit”.
76 Kim, ‘Who Initiated…’, p 43.
77 FRUS (1950) Vol. 7, pp 107-8.
78 Ibid, p 186.
79 Harry S. Truman, The President’s News Conference, 5 January 1950. Retrieved 6 November 2011 from
80 Stueck, The Korean War, p 30.
81 Drifte, “Japan’s Involvement in the Korean War”, p 121.
82 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, pp 74-5.
83 Farrar-Hockley, “The China Factor…”, p 6.
84 I. V. Petrova, The War in Korea 1950-1953, Saint Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Poligon, 2000, p 65.
85 Ibid, p 59.
87 See for example Bong Lee, The Unfinished War: Korea, New York: Algora, 2003, p 67; Norman Friedman, The
Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000, p 152; Gordon
Tullock, Open Secrets of American Foreign Policy, Singapore: World Scientific, 2007, p 30.
88 Floyd, “The Slander that Launched….”
89 David T. Fautua, “The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC-68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army,”
Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, no. 1 (January 1997).
90 M. L. Dockrill, “The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean Truce Negotiations July 1951 –
July 1953”, in James Cotton and Ian Neary (eds), The Korean War in History, Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1989, p 114.
91 Jeremy Black, War Since 1945, London: Reaktion Books, 2004, p 32.
92 Stueck, The Korean War, p 5.
93 Porter, Perils of Dominance, p 5.
94 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 67.
95 Stueck, The Korean War, p 45.
96 Kim, “Who Initiated…’, p 34.
97 Stueck, “The United States and the Origins…”, p 9.
98 UNSCR 82: Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, 25 June 1950. Retrieved 3 November 2011 from
99 UNSCR 83: Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, 27 June 1950. Retrieved 3 November 2011 from
100UNSCR 84: Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, 7 July 1950. Retrieved 3 November 2011 from
101Malkasian, The Korean War, p 17.
102Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p 76.
103Stueck, The Korean War, pp 34-5.
104Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p 161.
105Ibid, pp 161-2.
106Lando, Web of Deceit, pp 52-3.
107Bruce Cumings, “Cumings and Weatherby – An Exchange”, Cold War International History Bulletin, 6/7, 7 July
2011, p 121.
108Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p 260.